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measures, and to seal those that are correct and to condemn those
that are inaccurate, in order to protect the public from being
defrauded by inaccurate weights and measures. So it would seem
that the legislature did not intend to give the word "ton" a definite meaning so that whenever it was used it would mean 2,000
pounds. The fact that the court admits that special contract,
showing that the parties contracted upon the basis of another
standard, would prevail over the statute, would seem to indicate
that the court thought that the legislature had not given a definite
meaning to the word "ton," for a contract contrary to statute
is invalid. So it is submitted that if upon a very broad construction of the statute, it is held that the statute gives a definite
meaning to the word "ton," so that whenever it is used it shall
mean 2,000 pounds and that evidence of usage to the contrary
is inadmissible, it would seem to follow that evidence of a special
contract would be inadmissible. But if, on the other hand, the
statute is not so broadly construed, but with a view as to what
the legislature intended, which seems to be that the legislature had
not given a definite meaning to the word "ton" and which the
court virtually admits on the one hand by holding that a special
contract would govern,.then it would seem that evidence of custom
as well as of a special contract would be admissible. (Case also
commented on in 39 Harvard Law Review 122).

-W. P. L.
EVIDENCE-RIGHT OF PRESIDING JUDGE TO ASK LEADING QUES-

TIONS OR To TEsTFY.-In

a prosecution for retailing liquor with-

out having paid the special tax therefor, the defendant denied all
the charges. The presiding judge then asked certain leading
questions which elicited the fact of an extra-judicial conference
with the judge in which the defendant made statements amounting
to an admission. Exception. Held, the interrogation by the
judge was in effect the same as testimony by him and was therefore reversible error. Terrell v. United States, 6'FED. (d) 498.
It is generally held that a presiding judge may not testify in
a case unless he descends from the bench and another is appointed
in his stead to conduct the trial. Rogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 29
S. W. 894; People v. Dohring, 59 N. Y. 374; III WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1909. But did the court in the principal case testify?
His questioning achieved the same result as would his testimony
from the stand, but the testimony itself all came from the witness.
If the same questions had been asked by counsel the objection, if
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any, would probably have been that they were leading questions
rather than that counsel was testifying. The court generally has
wide discretion as to the examination of witnesses. The rule has
been thus broadly stated, "We know of no limit to the right
which belongs to the court of interrogating witnesses either in
civil or criminal cases, especially the latter."
Lumpkin, J. in
State v. Epps, 19 Ga. 106, 118. Indeed, this function of the
court has been referred to as a duty rather than a right. State
v. Nickens, 122 Mo. 607. The court may propound leading questions. Driscoll v. People, 11 Mich. 221; although in a few jurisdictions such questions are held to violate constitutional guarantees
against expressions of opinion by the court. State v. Crotts, 22
Wash. 245, 60 Pac. 403. But see Wilson v. Ohio River etc. Ry.
52 S. C. 537, 30 S. E. 406. Is this function of the court to question a witness to be confined to the expansion or explanation
of testimony already introduced? Such a limitation would tend
to relegate the court to the position of a mere umpire, unable to
take the initiative in uncovering facts necessary to secure justice
to all concerned. Judges in England have been accorded a more
honorable position. I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 784. And although
there is some authority in this country restricting the right of a
judge to interrogate witnesses, Dunn v. People, 172 Ill. 582, 50 N.
E. 137; Harris v. State, 61 Ga. 359, the courts are naturally
somewhat jealous of their power to exercise this function. It
seems hardly practical so to limit the right of the judge to assist
counsel in uncovering the necessary facts, especially in view of the
fact that thq judge is the most learned and trustworthy branch of
the tribunal. This view has been summed up in these words, "A
judge presiding during the trial of a cause is more than a mere
moderator between contending parties;. he is charged with the
grave duty of maintaining truth and preventing wrong, and to
this end has a discretion, which if not abused, will not be error."
Huffman v. Cauble, 86 Ind. 591. A further principle having some
bearing on the principal case is the one that it is largely within the
discretion of the trial judge to regulate the examination of witnesses, and that he may in his discretion allow counsel to put leading questions. In the exercise of this discretion his rulings are
generally not subject to review by an appellate court. Sanger v.
Flow, 48 Fed. 152, 1 C. 0. A. 56; Peters v. United States, 94 Fed.
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127, 36 C. C. A. 105; Rainey v. Potter, 120 Fed. 651, 57 0. 0. A.
113. This was apparently the view of the court in a case similar
to the principal case, where the interrogation was considered
erroneous, but not such error as would justify reversal. Lepper
v. United States, 233 Fed. 227.
-J. E. W.
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